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Preface

T

he deductibility of charitable donations has been a feature of the U.S. individual
income tax almost as long as the modern income tax has been in existence. Notwithstanding
the long duration of that deduction, concerns about its cost, equity, and efficiency have
prompted many proposals to change the tax treatment of charitable contributions.
At the request of the former Chairman of the House Committee on the Budget, the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has examined patterns of individual charitable giving
and analyzed how options for changing the tax treatment of such giving might affect the overall level of donations, the costs to the federal government, and the distribution of tax benefits
by income group. In keeping with CBO’s mandate to provide objective, impartial analysis,
this study makes no recommendations.
Athiphat Muthitacharoen of CBO’s Tax Analysis Division and Seth Giertz, formerly of
CBO, wrote the study under the direction of Frank Sammartino and David Weiner. Janet
Holtzblatt, William Randolph, Julie Somers, and Andrew Stocking of CBO provided helpful
comments on earlier drafts, as did Jon Bakija of Williams College and Joe Cordes of the
Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration at George Washington
University. (The assistance of external reviewers implies no responsibility for the final product,
which rests solely with CBO.)
Chris Howlett edited the study, and Christine Bogusz proofread it. Jeanine Rees prepared the
report for publication, and Maureen Costantino designed the cover. Monte Ruffin printed the
initial copies, and Linda Schimmel handled the print distribution. The report is available on
CBO’s Web site (www.cbo.gov).

Douglas W. Elmendorf
Director
May 2011
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Summary

U

nder current law, taxpayers who itemize deductions may deduct the amount they donate to charities
from their adjusted gross income (AGI) when determining how much they owe in federal income taxes. That
deduction gives people who itemize an incentive to contribute to charities. Like other forms of preferential tax
treatment, the deduction also costs the federal government revenues that it might otherwise collect. At current
levels of charitable giving, the cost of that deduction—
measured as the additional revenues that could be collected if the deduction was eliminated—will total about
$230 billion between 2010 and 2014, according to the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).1
Numerous proposals have been made in recent years to
alter the income tax treatment of charitable giving by
individual donors. Some proposals aim to reduce the
cost to the government by imposing a floor (or minimum
level) that a person’s charitable giving would have to
exceed to qualify for preferential tax treatment. Other
proposals would extend the current charitable deduction
to taxpayers who do not itemize deductions or would
replace the current deduction with a nonrefundable tax
credit available to all taxpayers who make charitable
contributions.2
For this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
examined how much taxpayers in various income groups
1. A deduction for charitable contributions also exists under the corporate income tax. JCT estimates a much smaller five-year cost for
that deduction: about $17 billion. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2010–
2014, JCS-3-10 (December 15, 2010), www.jct.gov/publications
.html?func=startdown&id=3718.
2. Taxpayers can use tax credits to reduce their income tax liability
(the amount they owe). Nonrefundable credits can lower income
tax liability to zero, but excess credits cannot be used to increase
tax refunds. In contrast, refundable credits that exceed income tax
liability are paid to taxpayers as refunds.

donate to charities and what types of organizations
receive those donations. CBO also investigated how
changing the structure of tax incentives for giving would
affect the tax subsidy (the cost in forgone revenues to
the federal government), the overall level of charitable
giving, and the extent to which different income groups
benefit from the tax preference. Specifically, CBO looked
at 11 options for altering the current income tax treatment of charitable giving, which can be grouped into
4 categories:
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but
adding a floor.
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim the deduction, with or
without a floor.
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit
for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent of a taxpayer’s
charitable donations, with or without a floor.
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit
for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer’s
charitable donations, with or without a floor.

For each of the four categories, CBO analyzed two
potential floors: a fixed dollar amount ($500 for single
taxpayers and $1,000 for couples filing a joint return)
and a percentage of income (2 percent of AGI). Only
contributions in excess of the floor would be deductible
or eligible for a credit. The analysis uses data for 2006,
the most recent year for which the Internal Revenue Service’s public-use sample of individual income tax returns
is available. The tax treatment of charitable contributions
is generally the same today as it was in 2006; however,
because of rising incomes and contribution amounts, the
options that include a fixed dollar floor would have a
somewhat different impact today than presented here.
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Effects of Policy Options on Tax
Subsidies and Charitable Donations

According to CBO’s modeling, adding a contribution
floor to any of the approaches listed above would reduce
both the total federal tax subsidy and the total amount
donated to charity, relative to the same option without a
floor. In each case that CBO examined, the reduction in
the subsidy (and thus the increase in revenues) would
exceed the reduction in charitable contributions, whether
measured in dollars or as a percentage change. The reason
is that introducing a floor would continue to provide a
tax incentive for additional giving above the level of the
floor and at the same time reduce the tax subsidy for
donations that people might have made even without a
tax incentive.3
Allowing all taxpayers to claim a deduction for charitable
giving would have increased donations in 2006 by an
estimated $2.0 billion (or 1 percent) and increased the
total tax subsidy by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent) from the
2006 amounts. Combining a deduction for all taxpayers
with a floor, however, could both increase donations and
decrease the tax subsidy. For example, such a deduction
combined with a fixed dollar floor of $500/$1,000 would
have increased donations by $800 million in 2006 and
decreased the tax subsidy by $2.5 billion (see Summary
Table 1).
Replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent tax
credit would increase donations and also increase the government’s forgone revenues. Combining such a credit
with certain contribution floors, however, could boost
donations while reducing the tax subsidy or could
decrease donations by a small percentage while reducing
the tax subsidy by a large percentage. Setting the credit at
15 percent would reduce donations but would reduce the
tax subsidy by a larger amount (both in dollars and as a
percentage change).

Effects of Policy Options on
Various Income Groups

Changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions
would have differing effects on taxpayers at different
3. The fact that some nonitemizers contribute to charities despite
receiving no tax benefits for doing so suggests that a substantial
amount of charitable giving would still occur in the absence of a
tax incentive.
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points on the income scale. Adding a contribution floor
to the current deduction for itemizers would reduce tax
subsidies for all income groups, but for high-income
taxpayers, the size of the reduction would vary significantly depending on the type of floor used. For instance,
augmenting the deduction with a fixed dollar floor of
$500/$1,000 in 2006 would have lowered the tax subsidy
for people with AGI over $100,000 by 0.08 percent of
their AGI, whereas adding a floor equal to 2 percent of
AGI would have lowered the tax subsidy for that income
group by 0.30 percent of their AGI.
Making the deduction for charitable contributions available to nonitemizers would benefit lower- and middleincome taxpayers, who tend not to itemize deductions
because their deductible expenses (such as mortgage
interest and state and local taxes, as well as charitable
donations) are not large enough to exceed the standard
deduction. Those groups would benefit even more if the
current deduction—which tends to help higher-income
taxpayers more because they face higher tax rates—was
replaced with a nonrefundable credit that gave all income
groups the same tax incentives for giving. For example,
replacing the deduction with a 25 percent credit in 2006
would have increased the tax subsidy for taxpayers with
AGI below $100,000 by 0.27 percent of their AGI, but it
would have decreased the tax subsidy for people above
that income level by 0.09 percent of AGI. Tax subsidies
would be lower for all income groups with a 15 percent
credit than with a 25 percent credit.

Caveats About This Analysis

The results of CBO’s policy simulations are meant to
highlight the general effects of the various approaches.
The exact size of those effects, however, would depend on
the specific parameters of a policy—such as the level of
the floor or the amount of the credit—as well as on the
extent to which taxpayers would change the amount of
their charitable giving in response to a change in the tax
subsidy. In addition, this analysis does not reflect many of
the other ways in which taxpayers might respond to a
change in their tax subsidy, such as shifting donations
between years. (In the appendix, CBO examines how
sensitive the results of this study are to several different
assumptions, including variations in taxpayers’ responsiveness to changes in their tax subsidy and the possibility
of shifts in the timing of donations.)

SUMMARY
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Summary Table 1.

Summary of Total Donations and Tax Subsidies Under Current Law and
Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Total Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Floor for
Eligible Donations

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Current Law

Deduction Available Only to Itemizers

203.0

No floor

40.9

Change from Current Law

Keep Deduction Available Only to Itemizers but
Add Floor
Option 1
Option 2

$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

-0.5
-3.0

-5.5
-15.7

Extend Deduction to All Filers
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

2.0
0.8
-1.9

5.2
-2.5
-13.1

Convert Deduction to 25 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Option 6
Option 7
Option 8

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

2.7
1.5
-1.0

7.1
-2.4
-11.9

Convert Deduction to 15 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Option 9
Option 10
Option 11

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

-7.8
-8.6
-10.0

-13.3
-19.0
-24.6

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
$500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.
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Introduction

Taxpayers who itemize deductions on their federal
income tax returns can reduce their tax liability by
deducting their donations to qualified nonprofit organizations—including organizations dedicated to religious,
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.
Both monetary contributions and the value of donated
financial assets or other property are deductible, subject
to certain annual limits (see Box 1). The tax treatment of
charitable giving, which has evolved over time, provides
various incentives for donations.
Although corporations can also deduct their charitable
donations, this analysis focuses on contributions by individual donors. The study examines patterns of individual
charitable giving and finds that the majority of such giving comes from a small number of taxpayers with high
incomes. The study also reviews concerns about the current tax treatment of giving and assesses how various
changes to that treatment would affect the amount of
donations made, the tax subsidies for them, and the
distribution of those subsidies by income group.

History of Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving
The deduction for charitable donations is a long-standing
feature of the individual income tax: It was created in
1917, just four years after the modern income tax began.1
The amount of charitable contributions that could be
deducted was initially capped at 15 percent of a taxpayer’s
income. In general, the deduction applied only to highincome people, because they were the only ones required
to pay the income tax in its early years.
During World War II, as the income tax expanded to
cover three-quarters of the U.S. population, the standard
1. The charitable deduction was enacted in the War Revenue Act
of 1917.

deduction was introduced as an option for taxpayers.2
The deductibility of charitable contributions was then
limited to taxpayers who chose to itemize deductions for
specific expenses they had incurred rather than claim the
standard deduction. (In determining the initial size of the
standard deduction, officials took into account a certain
typical amount of charitable contributions.)3
Nonitemizers were allowed to deduct their charitable
contributions for a brief period during the 1980s. The
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 created a temporary
“above-the-line” charitable deduction, permitting taxpayers who opted for the standard deduction to also
deduct charitable contributions.4 That provision was
gradually phased in starting in 1982 and took full effect
for 1986, after which it was allowed to expire.
Besides making charitable contributions during their lifetime, people can bequeath donations to charities from
their estates upon their death. Such bequests, although
not the focus of this analysis, can be deducted when
2. The standard deduction makes tax filing simpler because taxpayers do not need to keep track of all of their itemized expenses.
(Besides charitable donations, major expenses that can be
deducted include mortgage interest, state and local taxes, and
medical costs that exceed a certain percentage of a taxpayer’s
adjusted gross income.) In addition, the standard deduction lowers the tax burden for taxpayers who have small amounts of itemizable deductions. For 2011, the standard deduction is $5,800
for single filers, $11,600 for joint filers, and $8,500 for heads of
households.
3. See the statement of Congressman Willis A. Robertson, Congressional Record, vol. 90, 78th Cong., 2nd sess. (1944), p. 3973.
4. From 1982 to 1984, the deduction was capped at between $50
and $300. For 1985 and 1986, the cap was removed; instead,
nonitemizers could deduct 50 percent of their charitable contributions in 1985 and 100 percent of their charitable contributions in
1986.

CBO
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Box 1.

Current-Law Limits on the Deduction for Charitable Contributions
Under current law, deductions for cash donations
may not exceed 50 percent of a taxpayer’s adjusted
gross income (AGI). Deductions for donated property that has appreciated in value since it was initially
acquired are generally limited to 30 percent of AGI.
Although donations of appreciated property are subject to a lower percentage cap, to the extent that they
fall below the cap, they receive more-favorable tax
treatment than cash contributions do. The reason is
that taxpayers do not have to pay income tax on capital gains from appreciated property that they donate,
even though they can claim the fully appreciated
value as a deduction. Deductions that are limited by
those percentage-of-income caps can be claimed in
future years (as long as total deductions in those years
remain below the caps).
determining estate taxes.5 Charitable giving during one’s
lifetime has advantages over bequests, however, because it
can decrease individual income taxes now as well as estate
taxes later (by reducing the size of the estate that is left)
rather than just decreasing estate taxes.6

How Tax Incentives Affect Giving
By allowing itemizers to deduct their donations, the
government indirectly subsidizes charitable activities. For
example, someone in the 25 percent tax bracket faces an
after-tax price of only 75 cents when giving a dollar to
charity. In other words, a person in that bracket who
donates $1 to charity has his or her taxes reduced by
25 cents, so his or her consumption and savings decline
by just 75 cents. In general, the deduction lowers the
after-tax price per dollar of charitable contributions from
$1 to $1 multiplied by the difference between one and
the marginal tax rate.
Although the underlying motives for charitable giving
are complex and not fully understood by economists,
5. See Congressional Budget Office, The Estate Tax and Charitable
Giving (July 2004).
6. That statement is based on the assumption that earnings and
consumption behavior are not affected by whether donations
are made before or after death.

CBO

Beginning in 2013, with the expiration of the Tax
Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization,
and Job Creation Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-312),
high-income taxpayers will be subject to an additional limit on deducting charitable contributions.
At that point, if a taxpayer’s AGI exceeds a specific
threshold, total itemized deductions will be reduced
by 3 percent of the income above that threshold (with
the total reduction limited to 80 percent of the sum
of certain deductions). Because that limit is based on
the amount of income above the threshold, not on
the amount of itemized deductions, it will not affect
a taxpayer’s marginal incentive to give an additional
dollar to charity.

empirical studies generally find that taxpayers respond to
the after-tax price of giving to some degree. Such tax
incentives are limited, however, to the subset of taxpayers
who itemize, and they favor high-income people, who
face relatively higher marginal tax rates. That situation
raises several questions: Could tax subsidies for charitable
giving be extended to more taxpayers without costing the
federal government large amounts of forgone revenue?
Could the subsidies per dollar of giving be made equal for
taxpayers across the income distribution? This study
examines how policy options to address those questions
would affect donations, revenue costs, and the distribution of tax benefits.

Patterns of Individual
Charitable Giving

Donations by individuals make up the majority of
contributions to U.S. charities. According to the Center
on Philanthropy at Indiana University, U.S. charities
received a total of $304 billion in contributions in 2009
(equal to 2.2 percent of gross domestic product that
year).7 Of that amount, $227 billion, or approximately
7. See Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Giving USA
2010: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for Year 2009 (Chicago:
Giving USA Foundation, 2010).

OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE GIVING

75 percent, was donated by individuals. The other
25 percent came from foundations, corporations, and
estates (bequests).

Trends in Donations over Time
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s, individual giving
rose steadily, even after accounting for inflation. Over the
following five years, such giving soared, growing by more
than 60 percent between 1995 and 2000 (see Figure 1).
That surge was probably tied closely to gains in the
stock market. As the stock market declined after 2000,
inflation-adjusted individual giving fell by 4 percent in
2001 and stagnated through 2003, before increasing by
more than 13 percent between 2003 and 2007. With the
recession and renewed decline in the stock market that
began in late 2007, inflation-adjusted individual giving
declined by almost 4 percent in 2008 and stayed flat in
2009.
Among people who filed tax returns, charitable giving
averaged about 2.5 percent of income in 2008 (the latest
year for which such information is available). That figure
includes itemizers who deducted charitable donations as
well as nonitemizers, whose charitable giving was estimated by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on the
basis of surveys in which people report their contributions to charity. Giving as a share of income was fairly
similar for most income groups in 2008, except for the
highest-income taxpayers. Among people reporting more
than $500,000 in adjusted gross income (AGI) that year,
charitable giving averaged about 3.4 percent of income
(see Figure 2 on page 4).8
Higher-income households account for a significant
portion of individual giving. People who reported AGI
of at least $100,000 in 2008 were responsible for about
58 percent of charitable giving by taxpayers, although
they made up less than 13 percent of tax filers (see Table
1 on page 5). At the top of the income scale, less than 1
percent of taxpayers had AGI over $500,000, but they
made 24 percent of the total charitable contributions by
taxpayers in that year.

Recipients of Donations
Data from tax returns do not identify the different organizations to which individuals make donations.9 Instead,
8. For itemizers, giving as a share of income is U-shaped: The giving
rates at both ends of the income distribution are higher than those
in the middle.
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Figure 1.

Total Charitable Contributions by
Individual Donors, 1963 to 2009
(Billions of 2009 dollars)
250

200
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Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the
Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Giving USA
2010: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for Year 2009
(Chicago: Giving USA Foundation, 2010).

researchers in one study examined patterns of household
giving using surveys by the University of Michigan and
Bank of America.10 They found that, in general, the
higher a household’s income, the smaller the share of
donations that went to religious causes and the larger the
share that went to causes related to health, education, and
the arts. For example, among households with AGI below
$100,000, 67 percent of giving was directed toward religious organizations, and only 7 percent went to institutions that focus on health, education, or the arts (see Figure 3 on page 6). Among households that reported at
least $1 million in income, the situation was reversed:
9. The recipient organization is sometimes reported for donations by
itemizers, but even in those cases, the fact that many organizations
serve multiple functions makes it difficult to categorize the contributions by type of recipient.
10. See Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Patterns of
Household Charitable Giving by Income Group, 2005 (Indianapolis:
Indiana University–Purdue University, 2007). In that study,
estimates of giving by households with annual income below
$200,000 were based on the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study,
a module of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted by
the University of Michigan. Estimates for households with annual
income above $200,000 were based on data from Bank of America’s Study of High Net Worth Philanthropy.

CBO
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Figure 2.

Percentage of Income That Tax Filers Contribute to Charity, by
Income Group, 2008
(Percentage of adjusted gross income)
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
Under
$50,000

$50,000 to
$100,000

$100,000 to
$200,000

$200,000 to
$500,000

Over
$500,000

Adjusted Gross Income

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Income Tax
Returns 2008 (revised July 2010); the Federal Reserve Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances; and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2002 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
Note: Includes CBO’s estimates of charitable contributions by people who filed income tax returns in 2008 but did not itemize deductions.

Just 17 percent of donations were made to religious organizations, and 65 percent were made to support health-,
education-, or arts-related activities.

Concerns About the Current Tax
Treatment of Charitable Giving

The present income tax treatment of charitable giving
subsidizes certain taxpayers’ donations to charitable organizations and activities. Although those donations are
generally seen as benefiting all of society, concerns have
been raised about the current structure of the federal
subsidy—in terms of the amount of forgone tax revenues,
the incentives for donating, and the degree to which
taxpayers respond to those incentives.

Cost to the Government of Subsidizing
Charitable Contributions
The revenue cost to the government of the charitable
deduction is not obvious from the total dollars donated
or deducted because the tax rate that would have applied
to the income had it not been donated (the marginal tax
rate) varies greatly among individuals. The marginal rate
can even vary for the same person depending on how
CBO

much he or she donates. One way to estimate the revenue
loss from charitable contributions is to simulate the
change in tax revenues that would result if there were no
deduction for charitable contributions and compare that
result with actual revenues using a microsimulation
model that can calculate the difference in taxes from a
representative sample of tax returns. Using that approach,
CBO estimates that the tax subsidy associated with the
charitable deduction totaled $40.9 billion for 2006.
The subsidy for charitable giving is concentrated among
high-income taxpayers to an even greater extent than
donations are (see Figure 4 on page 7). Although taxpayers reporting adjusted gross income of at least $100,000
accounted for 11 percent of tax returns and 57 percent of
charitable contributions in 2006, they received 76 percent of the tax subsidy associated with charitable deductions. In contrast, taxpayers reporting AGI of less than
$50,000 filed 66 percent of returns, accounted for
19 percent of charitable donations, and received 5 percent of the tax subsidy for donations.11 The difference in
11. Those numbers include CBO’s estimates of charitable contributions by income tax filers who did not itemize deductions.
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Table 1.

Charitable Contributions, by Tax Filers’ Itemizing Status and
Income Group, 2008

Adjusted Gross Income

Number of
Tax Returns
(Millions)

Share of
Tax Returns
(Percent)

Share of
Total Income
(Percent)

Amount of
Percentage of
Charitable
Filers with
Contributions
Charitable
(Billions of
Contributionsa
dollars) a

Share of
Charitable
Contributions
(Percent) a

All Filers

Under $50,000
$50,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $200,000
$200,000 to $500,000
Over $500,000
Total

93
31
14
3
___1

65
22
10
2
___1

21
27
22
12
18
___

53
81
90
93
94

37
47
43
24
49
___

19
24
21
12
24
___

142

100

100

64

199

100

14
18
12
3
__1

29
37
25
7
___2

8
23
28
17
25
___

70
82
90
93
95

20
40
41
24
49
___

12
23
23
14
28
___

48

100

100

81

173

100

Itemizers

Under $50,000
$50,000 to $100,000
$100,000 to $200,000
$200,000 to $500,000
Over $500,000
Total

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Income Tax
Returns 2008 (revised July 2010); the Federal Reserve Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances; and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2002 Consumer Expenditure Survey.
a. Includes CBO’s estimates of charitable contributions by people who filed income tax returns in 2008 but did not itemize deductions.

the tax subsidy occurs because higher-income people are
more likely to itemize deductions (and thus to receive a
tax subsidy for donations) and because higher-income
people generally pay higher marginal tax rates and thus
receive a larger subsidy (relative to other itemizers) per
dollar of donation.

Incentives Created by the Charitable Deduction
By subsidizing charities through individual income tax
deductions, the government leaves the choice about
which charities are subsidized largely to taxpayers. In
doing so, however, it makes no distinction about the
extent to which different charitable services would be
provided in the absence of the tax subsidy. A sufficiently
generous tax incentive can cause even charitable activities
with large social benefits to be provided beyond the point
at which the benefits to society of allocating more
resources to those activities are lower than the benefits of
allocating the same resources to other activities.

Subsidizing charitable organizations through income tax
deductions also means that the subsidy accrues only to
people who have income tax liability and itemize deductions and that the after-tax price of giving decreases with
the donor’s marginal tax rate. Because people with higher
income generally face higher marginal tax rates, they are
subsidized at a greater rate than lower-income taxpayers
are. In 2008, 25 percent of tax filers (or about 35 million
returns) faced a federal income tax rate of zero (see Table
2 on page 8).12 For those filers, the deductibility of charitable contributions gave them no tax benefits and hence
no tax incentive to donate. At the same time, the 5 percent of filers who were in the 28 percent, 33 percent, or
35 percent tax brackets faced a substantially lower price
of giving than the 54 percent of filers who faced tax rates
of 10 percent or 15 percent. Because the subsidy for a
12. Another 24 million potential tax filers were not required to file a
return that year, generally because their income was below the
filing thresholds.
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Figure 3.

How Donors Allocate Their Charitable Contributions, by Income Group and
Type of Recipient, 2005
(Percentage of donations)
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Other
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Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the Center on Philanthropy at Indiana University, Patterns of Household Charitable
Giving by Income Group, 2005 (Indianapolis: Indiana University–Purdue University, 2007).
a. Combined purpose funds, such as the United Way, receive contributions and allocate them to many different types of charities.
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Figure 4.

Different Income Groups’ Shares of Total Contributions and the
Total Tax Subsidy, 2006
(Percent)
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Source: Congressional Budget Office.

given amount of charitable donations increases along
with income, the deduction for charitable donations
reduces the degree to which the average income tax rate
(taxes as a percentage of income) rises as income grows.
Even so, the federal income tax and overall federal tax system both remain progressive, in that high-income filers
pay a much larger share of their income in taxes than
lower-income groups do.13

itemizing their deductions; they do not do so primarily
because their total itemized deductions, including charitable donations, are less than the standard deduction. If
people’s responsiveness to tax incentives increases with
income, the approach of providing higher marginal
incentives for charitable giving to higher-income taxpayers stimulates more donations; however, there is little
evidence that higher-income taxpayers are more responsive to the after-tax price of giving than other taxpayers
are.14 Nonetheless, the fact remains that the current subsidy gives lower-income households less incentive to
donate than it gives higher-income households.

Only about one-third of tax filers itemize their deductions. The price of giving for the two-thirds who do not
itemize (primarily people in the lower tax brackets) is
not subsidized, and thus—like people facing an income
tax rate of zero—they have no tax incentive to make
donations. Of course, nonitemizers have the option of

Taxpayers’ Responses to the Income Tax
Treatment of Giving

13. For example, CBO estimated that, on average, households that
were in the lowest one-fifth of the income distribution in 2007
(as measured by household income) received more in tax credits
than they paid in federal individual income taxes, whereas households in the highest one-fifth of the income scale paid federal
income taxes that averaged 14 percent of their income. With all
types of federal taxes included, households in the lowest one-fifth
of the income scale paid less than 5 percent of their income in federal taxes, on average, whereas those in the highest one-fifth of the
income scale paid about 25 percent of their income in federal
taxes. See Congressional Budget Office, Average Federal Tax Rates
in 2007 (June 2010).

14. Although the percentage of households that report making charitable contributions rises with income (see Table 1 on page 5),
empirical studies offer inconclusive evidence about whether
responsiveness to tax incentives differs significantly for households
at different income levels.

How taxpayers respond to the tax incentives for charitable giving depends on their underlying motive for making donations. Motivations for giving are complicated
and not fully understood. With a purely private good
(one whose full benefits accrue to the person bearing
the full cost), both the motivation and the behavior it

CBO
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Table 2.

Tax Filers, by Highest Marginal Tax
Rate, 2008
Highest Marginal
Rate (Percent)

0
10
15
25
28
33
35
All Tax Rates

Number of Tax
Returns (Millions)

Share of Tax
Returns (Percent)

35
26
50
23
4
2
____1

25
18
35
17
3
1
____1

142

100

Source: Congressional Budget Office based on Internal Revenue
Service, Statistics of Income Division, Individual Income
Tax Returns 2008 (revised July 2010).
Note: The statutory marginal tax rates shown here may not precisely correspond to the rates that apply to charitable deductions because they do not account for such factors as the
alternative minimum tax, the earned income tax credit, or
phaseouts for personal exemptions and itemized deductions.
These rates reflect only federal income taxes; combined federal and state marginal income tax rates are higher. (Most
state income taxes also allow a deduction for charitable
contributions.)

engenders are straightforward: People buy the good
because they receive benefits from it, and they keep
buying more units of the good until the benefit (the
value to them) of the next unit just equals the cost of the
next unit. That is also broadly true for charitable giving,
but measuring the benefit that donors receive is more
complicated.
Some giving is probably motivated by altruism: People
receive satisfaction from knowing that others in society
are helped. The satisfaction of the donor depends partly
on the satisfaction of others, regardless of who is paying
for the help that is given. In the altruistic view, a potential
donor is just as pleased if a third party steps in and provides the contribution instead. Some giving, however, is
motivated not only by pure altruism but also by the
“warm glow” that some people feel when giving or helping others—or from receiving public recognition for their
good deeds.15 In that case, the donor’s self-satisfaction
15. See James Andreoni, “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public
Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving,” Economic Journal,
vol. 100, no. 401 (1990), pp. 464–477.
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depends on believing that he or she played a role in (or is
being recognized for) helping others. Still other giving is
more analogous to a private good, with the benefits
directly accruing in proportion to the size of the
donation. Examples include gifts to college sports programs (often in exchange for preferential treatment in
purchasing tickets to athletic events) and donations to art
museums (which sometimes confer special benefits only
for donors).
Although those various motivations may prompt different kinds of responses to incentives for charitable giving,
empirical studies have generally found that the amount of
giving is responsive to changes in the after-tax price of
giving. That responsiveness can be measured by the price
elasticity of charitable giving—the percentage change in
donations associated with a 1 percent increase in the price
of giving.
Policymakers are generally interested in the permanent
effects of policy changes, so estimates of how various policy options would alter charitable giving must rely on
elasticity estimates that distinguish between transitory
shifts in giving and permanent responses to a policy
change. For example, a taxpayer who faces a temporary
fluctuation in income has an incentive to shift donations
to years when income is temporarily high and thus the
after-tax price of giving is low. Taxpayers may also change
the timing of their donations in response to a preannounced change in tax law. The Tax Reform Act of
1986, which sharply reduced marginal income tax rates
for high-income taxpayers, offers a good example. Charitable giving by high-income taxpayers increased steeply in
1986, possibly in anticipation of that law, which was
enacted in October 1986 and gradually phased in
between 1987 and 1988. Failing to address shifts in giving that result from income fluctuations or preannounced
changes in tax law may cause an elasticity estimate to be
biased upward (in absolute value).
Most studies that estimate the relationship between
charitable giving and tax rates use data from tax returns.
Among those studies, ones that distinguish between permanent and transitory responses to price variation have
found mixed evidence about the permanent price elasticity of giving. Elasticity estimates vary significantly as a
result of differences in the underlying data and time
periods studied and the different methods used to derive
the estimates. For example, one prominent study that
examined a panel data set covering 10 years estimated a
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permanent price elasticity of giving of -0.5 (meaning that
a 1 percent increase in the price of giving would reduce
donations by 0.5 percent).16 Another study that used an
expanded version of the same data set but applied a different methodology reported elasticity estimates ranging
from -0.8 to -1.3.17
Experimental methods offer another approach to estimate the relationship between the price and level of
charitable giving. For instance, researchers have studied
how people alter the amount of their contributions in
response to matching grants (conditional offers to match
contributions at a specified rate). Researchers in one
study conducted a field experiment on existing donors to
a charitable organization and found that announcing the
availability of a matching grant increased donations,
although the level of contributions was not affected by
differences in the matching rate announced.18 That study
estimated an overall price elasticity of -0.3, lower than the
estimates from the aforementioned studies that were
based on tax data. Because the experiment was framed as
a matching grant rather than a change in the after-tax
price of giving, however, the result may not be directly
applicable to policies involving changes in tax rates.

Effects of Policy Options to Alter the
Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving

In recent years, numerous proposals have been made to
change the tax incentives for charitable giving. Such
changes could take various forms, which would have different impacts on the costs to the federal government, the
amount of charitable giving, and the number and types of
taxpayers who would benefit. To illustrate the effects of a
range of possible changes, CBO has examined 11 stylized
16. See William C. Randolph, “Dynamic Income, Progressive Taxes,
and the Timing of Charitable Contributions,” Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 103, no. 4 (1995), pp. 709–738.
17. See Gerald E. Auten, Sieg Holger, and Charles T. Clotfelter,
“Charitable Giving, Income, and Taxes: An Analysis of Panel
Data,” American Economic Review, vol. 92, no. 1 (2002), pp. 371–
382. Also see Jon Bakija and Bradley T. Heim, “How Does Charitable Giving Respond to Incentives and Income? New Estimates
from Panel Data,” National Tax Journal (forthcoming), which
assembled the same data set and two others and found similar
results.
18. See Dean Karlan and John A. List, “Does Price Matter in
Charitable Giving? Evidence from a Large-Scale Natural Field
Experiment,” American Economic Review, vol. 97, no. 5 (2007),
pp. 1774–1793.
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policy options. The most important characteristics of the
options are whether the tax benefit includes a floor (or
minimum amount of donations) below which contributions are not subsidized; whether it is restricted to itemizers or is available to all taxpayers; and whether it takes the
form of a tax deduction or a credit. The options can be
grouped into 4 sets according to those characteristics:
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but
adding a floor.
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim the deduction, with or
without a floor.
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit
for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent of a taxpayer’s
charitable donations, with or without a floor.
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit
for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer’s
charitable donations, with or without a floor.

In each option with a floor, the minimum contribution
level was specified to be either a fixed dollar amount
($500 for people filing individually and $1,000 for
couples filing a joint return) or a percentage of income
(2 percent of AGI). Only the amount of a taxpayer’s total
charitable donations that exceeded that floor would be
deductible or eligible for a credit.
If the current deduction for itemizers was augmented
with a floor, the deduction would continue to provide
incentives for charitable giving but at a much lower subsidy cost. The total amount of donations would decline,
but the tax subsidy would decline by a much larger
amount, CBO estimates. For example, a fixed dollar floor
that allowed itemizers to deduct charitable giving in
excess of $500 for individuals and $1,000 for joint filers
would decrease annual donations by $0.5 billion relative
to current law, CBO estimates, but would decrease the
federal tax subsidy by $5.5 billion (see Table 3). Both of
the reductions would be larger with a higher floor
(whether the floor was specified in dollar terms or as a
percentage of AGI). Those results would occur because
most donations would come from taxpayers who gave
amounts above the floor, and although the floor would
reduce the subsidy that those taxpayers received, it would
maintain their tax incentive to make an additional dollar
of donations.

CBO
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Table 3.

Total Donations and Tax Subsidies Under Current Law and
Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Floor for
Eligible
Donations

Change in Total
Contributions from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Total
Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in
Tax Subsidy from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Current Law

Deduction Available
Only to Itemizers

No floor

203.0

n.a.

n.a.

40.9

n.a.

n.a.

Options to Change Current Law

Keep Deduction Available
Only to Itemizers but
Add Floor
Option 1
Option 2

$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

202.5
200.0

-0.5
-3.0

-0.2
-1.5

35.4
25.2

-5.5
-15.7

-13.5
-38.5

Extend Deduction to
All Filers
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

205.0
203.8
201.1

2.0
0.8
-1.9

1.0
0.4
-0.9

46.1
38.4
27.8

5.2
-2.5
-13.1

12.8
-6.1
-32.1

Convert Deduction to
25 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Option 6
Option 7
Option 8

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

205.7
204.5
202.0

2.7
1.5
-1.0

1.3
0.7
-0.5

48.0
38.5
29.0

7.1
-2.4
-11.9

17.4
-5.8
-29.2

Convert Deduction to
15 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Option 9
Option 10
Option 11

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

195.2
194.4
193.0

-7.8
-8.6
-10.0

-3.9
-4.2
-4.9

27.6
21.9
16.3

-13.3
-19.0
-24.6

-32.6
-46.5
-60.1

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
n.a. = not applicable; $500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.

Extending the current deduction to all filers or making a
relatively large nonrefundable tax credit available to all
filers would have the opposite effect: increasing both
donations and the tax subsidy. However, CBO’s analysis
indicates that if either of those approaches was combined
with a contribution floor, it would be possible to raise
donations while simultaneously reducing the tax subsidy.
For instance, combining a 25 percent tax credit with a

CBO

$500/$1,000 floor would raise donations by $1.5 billion
and boost federal revenues by $2.4 billion. Other floors
set sufficiently low could be combined with a deduction
or a 25 percent tax credit to achieve a similar result.
If a much smaller credit for all filers, such as 15 percent,
was combined with a floor, the effect on total donations
and the total tax subsidy would be more like that of
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adding a floor to the current deduction for itemizers:
both lower donations and a lower tax subsidy, regardless
of the range of values used for the floor. In proportional
terms, the impact on donations would be far smaller than
the impact on the tax subsidy. With a 15 percent credit
and a $500/$1,000 floor, charitable contributions would
decline by 4 percent ($8.6 billion), whereas the tax
subsidy would decline by 47 percent ($19.0 billion).
The effects of the policy options on tax subsidies would
also vary by income group. Nonitemizers, who are primarily low- and middle-income taxpayers, would clearly
gain from the options that extended tax benefits to them.
Adding either type of floor to a policy option would
reduce tax subsidies across the board (relative to the comparable option without a floor), but the implications for
high-income taxpayers would vary significantly between a
fixed dollar floor and a percentage-of-income floor. With
a floor set at 2 percent of AGI, for instance, high-income
taxpayers would find it harder to reach the minimum
level of contributions required to obtain the tax benefit
than they would with a fixed $500/$1,000 floor.
CBO estimated the impact of the policy options using
2006 tax data and assessed each option relative to the tax
rules in effect for that year, which are largely the same as
those in effect for 2011.19 (For details about how CBO
produced the estimates, see Box 2.) In calculating an
option’s impact on contributions, CBO assumed that
charitable giving has a price elasticity of -0.5, meaning
that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax price of giving
reduces donations by 0.5 percent. Because empirical evidence about the size of the elasticity is mixed, CBO also
analyzed the options assuming a higher degree of responsiveness (an elasticity of -1.0) and assuming that charitable contributions are not affected at all by the after-tax
price of giving (an elasticity of 0). Those sensitivity
analyses are discussed in the appendix.
19. Tax law in both 2006 and 2011 contains the major provisions
originally enacted in the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2003. The major difference between the two
years in terms of the tax treatment of charitable giving is that 2006
tax law reduced the total value of certain itemized deductions—
including the deduction for charitable contributions—for highincome taxpayers, whereas 2011 law does not have such a
reduction.
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Options 1 and 2: Deduction for Itemizers,
With a Floor
The first set of options would keep the current itemized
deduction for charitable contributions but allow only
contributions in excess of a floor to be deducted. A floor
would remove the subsidy for smaller donations—most
of which would probably be made even without a tax
incentive—but it would maintain the marginal incentive
to give for people making larger donations. Imposing a
floor would lower contributions to some extent, because
some taxpayers who now contribute less than the amount
of the floor might reduce their donations. A floor could
also make decisionmaking more complex for taxpayers
and would provide an incentive for “lumpy” donations,
in which people donate more in one year and nothing
in other years in order to maximize their deductible
contributions.20
Options 1 and 2 would maintain the charitable deduction for itemizers but would introduce different types of
floors:
 Option 1 would let itemizers deduct the amount of
their charitable donations in excess of $500 for
individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers.
 Option 2 would let itemizers deduct the amount of
their charitable donations in excess of 2 percent of
their AGI.

The tax benefits to itemizers would be less generous
under Option 1 than under current law; thus, some
itemizers would choose to take the standard deduction
rather than continue to itemize their deductions.21
Nonitemizers would be unaffected. For most filers—all
nonitemizers plus itemizers who donate more than the
amount of the floor—the after-tax price of the last dollar
of giving would remain unchanged. However, taxpayers
20. With a $500 floor, for example, a taxpayer who donated $1,000 in
each of two years would be allowed to deduct a total of $1,000,
whereas a taxpayer who donated $2,000 in one year and nothing
the next year could deduct a total of $1,500. The possibility that
taxpayers will change the timing of deductions in response to a
floor is an important consideration in designing such a policy.
That issue is explored in more detail in the appendix.
21. In general, the taxpayers who would no longer choose to itemize
would be those for whom itemized deductions minus the lesser of
their charitable contributions or $500 (for individuals) would be
less than the standard deduction.

CBO
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Box 2.

The Basis for CBO’s Estimates
The analysis in this study is based on the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) individual income
tax model, which uses data for 2006. In the model,
a sample representing all households in the United
States is constructed by combining information from
the Internal Revenue Service’s 2006 Statistics of
Income public-use sample of individual income tax
returns with information from the Census Bureau’s
March 2007 Current Population Survey. For returns
without itemized deductions, CBO estimated charitable contributions using surveys in which people
report their charitable giving (the Federal Reserve’s
2004 Survey of Consumer Finances for people giving
over $500 and the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 2002
Consumer Expenditure Survey for those giving less
than $500). Taxes and tax rates were estimated using
CBO’s tax calculator. All estimates are for tax year
2006 and reflect the extent to which tax subsidies and
charitable giving would have been different had a
given option been in place in that year.

Calculating the Tax Subsidy for
Charitable Contributions
This analysis estimates the cost of the tax preference
for charitable donations by focusing on the change in
revenues directly attributable to the level of charitable
giving. That approach contrasts with the type of revenue estimates that are the responsibility of the staff of
the Joint Committee on Taxation. Such estimates
would reflect many of the ways in which taxpayers
might alter their behavior in response to the existence
of the tax preference, such as changing the timing of
donations between years and changing their tax compliance. The measure that CBO used does not reflect
all of the behavioral assumptions that would be
included in a revenue estimate; it accounts only for
changes in the amount of charitable giving and any
changes in itemization status that would occur if the
standard deduction was larger than a taxpayer’s noncharitable itemized deductions.

Although CBO’s measure incorporates fewer types of
responses than a true revenue estimate, it is also less
sensitive to the design details of an option. Thus, it is
more suited to portraying the costs of highly stylized
options such as the ones examined in this analysis.
Removing the emphasis on design details makes it
possible to identify the salient characteristics of
broad approaches to changing the tax treatment of
charitable contributions.
In this analysis, taxpayers were modeled as choosing
to itemize deductions or claim the standard deduction under each policy option. The calculations
assumed that taxpayers would maximize the amount
of their total deductions. Thus, for example, if the
deduction for charitable contributions was extended
to nonitemizers, some taxpayers who had been itemizers would switch to being nonitemizers if that policy change lowered their total tax bill. The cost of
subsidizing charitable giving under current law and
the policy options was calculated by comparing the
amount of income tax owed under a given policy
with the amount that would be owed if there was no
deduction for charitable contributions.
For options that include a floor, only the portion of a
taxpayer’s contributions above that minimum level
would be eligible for a deduction or a credit. For
example, under an option with a fixed-dollar floor of
$500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers, a
couple who itemized their deductions and donated
$1,500 to charity would be able to claim only $500
in donations as an itemized deduction on their
return, and a couple who itemized and donated $750
would not be able to deduct any of their donations.

Estimating the Effects of Policy
Options on Giving
To evaluate the impact of each option, CBO estimated how much taxpayers would change the
Continued

CBO
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The Basis for CBO’s Estimates
Tax Subsidies Under Current Law, by Income Group, 2006
(Percentage of adjusted gross income)
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Source: Congressional Budget Office.

amount they donate in response to a change in the
after-tax price of giving.1 The change in contributions was calculated by applying a tax price elasticity
to existing contributions using the applicable change
in the after-tax price of giving.2 That price was estimated by calculating marginal tax rates on charitable
giving from each individual record in CBO’s income
tax model under 2006 law and under each policy
option. For example, under an option that would
extend the deduction for charitable contributions to
nonitemizers, a taxpayer in the 25 percent bracket
who claimed a standard deduction would see his or
her tax price of giving fall from $1 per dollar of giving
to 75 cents per dollar of giving, a 25 percent decline.

1. This analysis reflects only the change in the relative price of
charitable contributions. The change in the income tax treatment of charitable contributions would also affect taxpayers’
after-tax income. Those income effects are likely to be small,
however, because charitable contributions average only about
2 percent to 3 percent of a taxpayer’s income (see Figure 2 on
page 4).
2. The tax price elasticity for charitable giving is the ratio of the
percentage change in giving to the percentage change in its
after-tax price. For example, a price elasticity of -0.5 means
that a 1 percent increase in the after-tax price of giving
reduces donations by 0.5 percent.

Because empirical evidence about the responsiveness
of taxpayers’ charitable contributions to their tax
treatment is inconclusive, CBO calculated the results
using alternative elasticity values (0 and -1.0) in addition to the main value (-0.5) used in the analysis. In
addition, CBO examined the sensitivity of the results
to the assumption that a certain amount of contributions—such as regular donations to religious organizations—would be made regardless of changes in
their after-tax price. CBO also explored the potential
effects of taxpayers’ shifting donations into different
years to increase the tax subsidies they receive. (See
the appendix for those additional analyses.)

Estimating Differences in Effects by
Income Level
CBO assessed the distributional implications of the
policy options by comparing tax subsidy rates (the tax
subsidy divided by adjusted gross income) for various
income groups under a given option and under 2006
law. In 2006, subsidy rates ranged from 0.12 percent
for taxpayers with adjusted gross income under
$50,000 to 0.96 percent for taxpayers with income
above $500,000 (see the figure above). Subsidy rates
rise with income because higher-income taxpayers are
more likely to itemize deductions and because the
after-tax price of giving declines as the marginal
income tax rate increases with income.

CBO
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Table 4.

Sources of Changes in Tax Subsidies Under Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Source of Change in Tax Subsidy (Billions of dollars)
Existing
Existing Giving by Itemizers
Giving by
Who Switch to
Who Remain
Nonitemizers Being Nonitemizers
Itemizers

Floor for
Eligible
Donations

Net
Change in
Giving

Keep Deduction Available
Only to Itemizers but Add Floor
Option 1
Option 2

$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

0.1

0
0

-0.1
-0.4

-5.5
-15.4

-5.5
-15.7

Extend Deduction to All Filers
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

0.5
0.3
0.3

3.2
1.3
0.9

1.6
1.0
0.3

0
-5.0
-14.7

5.2
-2.5
-13.1

Convert Deduction to 25 Percent
Nonrefundable Credit for All Filers
Option 6
Option 7
Option 8

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

0.8
0.5
0.6

4.7
1.9
1.5

2.5
1.7
0.9

-0.9
-6.5
-14.9

7.1
-2.4
-11.9

Convert Deduction to 15 Percent
Nonrefundable Credit for All Filers
Option 9
Option 10
Option 11

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

-1.2
-1.2
-1.0

2.9
1.1
0.9

-0.3
-0.8
-1.3

-14.8
-18.2
-23.2

-13.3
-19.0
-24.6

*

Total

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels. The total tax subsidy under 2006 law was $40.9 billion.
$500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; * = between zero and $50 million; AGI = adjusted gross income.

who itemize deductions and donate less than the floor
would no longer have a tax incentive for those donations.22 Overall, donations would be reduced by $0.5 billion (or less than 1 percent), and the tax subsidy would be
reduced by $5.5 billion (or 14 percent), from the levels
associated with 2006 tax law (see Table 3 on page 10).
Like the fixed dollar floor, the percentage-of-income floor
in Option 2 would make benefits to itemizers less generous than under current law and would not affect nonitemizers. Low-income itemizers would be able to reach
the minimum contribution level more easily with this
type of floor than with the fixed dollar floor. Although
more middle- and high-income itemizers would see their
after-tax price of giving increase, incentives for large
22. In addition, there may be some itemizers who have no tax liability
under current law but would have tax liability under the option
and would face a reduction in the after-tax price of giving. Those
few itemizers would have an increased incentive to donate.
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contributors would be virtually unchanged. Under this
option, donations would fall by $3.0 billion (or 2 percent) and the tax subsidy would be reduced by $15.7 billion (or 39 percent) from the 2006 levels. Almost all of
the added revenues in Options 1 and 2 would come from
eliminating the tax subsidy for contributions below the
level of the floor by taxpayers who continued to itemize
their deductions (see Table 4).
Adding either a fixed dollar floor or a percentage-ofincome floor to the current deduction would lower the
tax subsidy rate—the total tax subsidy divided by total
income—for all income groups. Higher-income taxpayers would face a much higher threshold for deducting
donations with the percentage-of-income floor than with
the dollar floor. Thus, the change in the tax subsidy for
higher-income taxpayers would differ significantly
between the two options. For taxpayers with AGI over
$500,000, for example, the dollar floor in Option 1

OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE TAX TREATMENT OF CHARITABLE GIVING

would decrease their tax subsidy by just 0.02 percent
of AGI, whereas the percentage-of-income floor in
Option 2 would lower their tax subsidy by 0.28 percent
of AGI (see Figure 5 on page 16).

giving fall—and would possibly increase their charitable
donations as a result—would be nonitemizers with positive tax liability, who could take advantage of the more
broadly available deduction.26

Options 3 to 5: Deduction for All Taxpayers,
With or Without a Floor

Extending the charitable deduction to nonitemizers
without any contribution floor, as in Option 3, would
increase donations by $2 billion (or 1 percent), CBO
estimates (see Table 3 on page 10). The tax subsidy
would increase by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent), of which
$3.2 billion would go to subsidize existing contributions
by nonitemizers (see Table 4). Another large piece of the
increase in the tax subsidy, $1.6 billion, would result
from itemizers’ choosing to take the standard deduction
because it exceeded their noncharitable deductions.27 The
net change in giving would account for only $0.5 billion
of the increase in the total tax subsidy.

Another approach that CBO examined would be to allow
everyone who files an income tax return to deduct charitable contributions (subject to the rules that now apply to
itemizers, as explained in Box 1 on page 2), under three
variations:
 Option 3 would have no floor on the amount of
donations that could be deducted.23
 Option 4 would have the same fixed dollar floor as
Option 1 ($500 for single filers and $1,000 for joint
filers).
 Option 5 would have the same percentage-of-income
floor as Option 2 (2 percent of AGI).

Under those options, some itemizers would be expected
to become nonitemizers, because nonitemizers would be
treated more favorably than under current law, whereas
the tax treatment of itemizers would not change. Itemizers whose other itemized deductions totaled less than the
standard deduction would generally benefit from taking
the standard deduction and claiming the new nonitemized charitable deduction as well. For those taxpayers, the
sum of the standard deduction and the new deduction for
charitable contributions would exceed the total itemized
deductions they could have claimed under 2006 law.24
Taxpayers making that change would not be expected to
alter their giving, however, because itemization status
would not affect their after-tax price of giving.25 The only
group of taxpayers who would see their after-tax price of
23. The President’s budgetary proposals for fiscal years 2002 through
2005 included a charitable deduction for nonitemizers. Those
proposals were more restrictive than the option analyzed here,
which would allow nonitemizers to subtract all of their charitable
contributions from their AGI (subject to the same restrictions as
itemizers) in addition to claiming the standard deduction. See
Office of Management and Budget, Budget of the U.S. Government
for those years; also see Congressional Budget Office, Budget
Options (February 2007), Revenue Option 11, “Create an Abovethe-Line Deduction for Charitable Giving”; and Congressional
Budget Office, Effects of Allowing Nonitemizers to Deduct Charitable Contributions (December 2002).
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Combining a floor with a deduction for all taxpayers
would produce tax savings for the government while
having relatively small effects on total donations. With
the fixed dollar floor in Option 4, total contributions
24. Under the options considered here, the incentive to switch itemization status would not exist for taxpayers paying the individual
alternative minimum tax (AMT), because the standard deduction
is not allowed for taxpayers paying the AMT. (Fewer than 3 percent of filers were subject to the AMT in 2006.) Also, the existing
limit on itemized deductions for high-income taxpayers (those
with AGI over $150,500 in 2006) could give some taxpayers an
additional incentive to switch itemization status under options
that would allow charitable deductions by nonitemizers, if that
limit did not apply to deductions by nonitemizers. This analysis
assumed that the limit would also apply to charitable deductions
claimed by nonitemizers and therefore would not provide an
additional incentive to change itemization status.
25. That statement is based on the assumption that behavioral effects
resulting from changes in income would be small. It also ignores
the fact that a small percentage of taxpayers would move into a
lower marginal tax bracket because of the change in itemization
status.
26. For that group, the after-tax price per dollar of giving would fall
from $1 to [$1 x (1 - their marginal tax rate)]. For most of those
taxpayers, the average and marginal price per dollar of giving
would be the same. However, deducting charitable donations
could move some taxpayers to a lower tax bracket, in which case
their marginal price of giving would exceed their average price of
giving.
27. Under the options that would extend tax incentives to nonitemizers without adding a floor (Options 3, 6, and 9), roughly 10 percent of itemizers would switch to the standard deduction, CBO
estimates.

CBO
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Figure 5.

Changes in Tax Subsidies Under Eleven Policy Options, by Income Group, 2006
(Percentage of adjusted gross income)
-0.03

Option 1

Adjusted Gross Income:

-0.09
-0.12
-0.09

• Deduction for itemizers
• $500/$1,000 floor for single/joint filers

Under $50,000
-0.02
-0.04

Option 2

$50,000 to $100,000

-0.15

• Deduction for itemizers

-0.28

• 2 percent of AGI floor

-0.36

$100,000 to $200,000
-0.28
0.12
0.10

Option 3
• Deduction for all taxpayers

$200,000 to $500,000

0.05

• No floor

0.01
0.01
0.03

Option 4

Over $500,000

-0.03

• Deduction for all taxpayers

-0.09
-0.08

• $500/$1,000 floor for single/joint filers

-0.01
0.02

Option 5

-0.10

• Deduction for all taxpayers

-0.25

• 2 percent of AGI floor

-0.36
-0.28
0.28
0.26

Option 6
• 25 percent credit for all taxpayers

0.02
-0.19

• No floor

-0.14
0.13

Option 7
• 25 percent credit for all taxpayers

0.08

-0.11

• $500/$1,000 floor for single/joint filers

-0.26
-0.15
0.12

Option 8
-0.26

• 25 percent credit for all taxpayers
• 2 percent of AGI floor

*0.00

-0.47
-0.38
0.12

Option 9
• 15 percent credit for all taxpayers

* 0

-0.24
-0.45

• No floor

-0.49
0.03

Option 10

-0.11

• 15 percent credit for all taxpayers
• $500/$1,000 floor for single/
-0.49
joint filers
-0.50

-0.32

0.03

Option 11
• 15 percent credit
for all taxpayers
-0.61
• 2 percent of
-0.64
AGI floor

-0.15
-0.41

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
* = between -0.005 percent and 0.005 percent.
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would increase by $0.8 billion (or less than 1 percent),
whereas the tax subsidy would decline by $2.5 billion
(or 6 percent). The subsidy for taxpayers who continued
to itemize their deductions would fall by $5.0 billion, but
those savings would be partly offset by new tax subsidies
of $1.3 billion for existing contributions by nonitemizers,
$1.0 billion for former itemizers who claimed the standard deduction instead, and $0.3 billion for the net
change in donations.
With a floor set at 2 percent of AGI, as in Option 5, total
contributions would decline by $1.9 billion (or nearly
1 percent), and the total tax subsidy would drop by
$13.1 billion (or 32 percent). The reduction in the tax
subsidy from excluding itemizers’ charitable contributions below the floor would amount to $14.7 billion,
almost triple the $5 billion in tax savings from the same
source under the similar option with the dollar floor
(Option 4). Those tax savings would be partly offset by
new tax subsidies of $0.9 billion for existing contributions by nonitemizers, $0.3 billion for former itemizers
who claimed the standard deduction instead, and
$0.3 billion for the net change in giving.
Low- and middle-income taxpayers would be the main
beneficiaries of extending the charitable deduction to
nonitemizers because they make up the bulk of people
who do not itemize deductions. Option 3 would raise the
tax subsidy by 0.12 percent of AGI for taxpayers with
income below $50,000 and by 0.10 percent of AGI for
those with income between $50,000 and $100,000 (see
Figure 5 on page 16). Taxpayers with AGI above
$100,000 would have a much smaller increase in their
tax subsidy rate (0.02 percent for that group as a whole).
Adding a floor to the deduction for all filers would still
increase the subsidy for taxpayers with income under
$50,000 but by a smaller amount: 0.03 percent of AGI
under Option 4 and 0.02 percent under Option 5. As in
the options to add a floor to the current deduction for
itemizers, upper income groups would see a larger reduction in their tax subsidy with a percentage-of-income
floor than with a fixed dollar floor.

Options 6 to 8: Nonrefundable 25 Percent Credit for
All Taxpayers, With or Without a Floor
An alternative way to extend tax benefits for charitable
giving to all filers would be to convert the current deduction into a nonrefundable tax credit equal to a percentage
of a taxpayer’s contributions.28 The credit could be
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various sizes. In this set of options, CBO examined the
effects of a credit equal to 25 percent of donations, with
the same three variations used earlier:
 Option 6 would have no floor that donations would
have to exceed to qualify for the credit.
 Option 7 would have the same fixed dollar floor as
Options 1 and 4 ($500 for individuals and $1,000 for
joint filers).
 Option 8 would have the same percentage-of-income
floor as Options 2 and 5 (2 percent of AGI).

Substituting a nonrefundable credit for the current
deduction would provide the same subsidy (per dollar of
giving) to all taxpayers who could fully claim the credit,
instead of a subsidy rate that increases with a filer’s marginal tax rate. A 25 percent nonrefundable credit would
tend to benefit lower- and middle-income taxpayers, who
generally face marginal tax rates of less than 25 percent.
Taxpayers facing tax rates above 25 percent would see a
decrease in subsidies under this option. As a result,
replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent credit
would probably increase the share of total income taxes
paid by higher-income people.
Taxpayers would respond in several ways if the itemized
deduction for charitable contributions was replaced with
a nonrefundable tax credit. Current itemizers whose
noncharitable deductions total less than the standard
deduction would generally no longer choose to itemize.
The after-tax price of giving would rise for itemizers
facing marginal tax rates above 25 percent, creating an
incentive for them to reduce contributions, whereas the
after-tax price would fall for itemizers facing marginal tax
rates below 25 percent, creating an incentive for them to
increase contributions. Nonitemizers with positive tax liability would generally face a lower after-tax price of giving
under this option and thus would also have an incentive
to raise their contributions. The overall effect on donations would depend on whether the increased giving by
people whose after-tax price of giving fell would exceed
the decreased giving by people whose after-tax price rose.
28. Nonrefundable tax credits are limited to the amount of a person’s
tax liability before credits. Refundable credits, such as the earned
income tax credit, can exceed tax liability before credits and result
in a refund payment from the government to the taxpayer.

CBO
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CBO estimates that with a 25 percent credit and no
floor (Option 6), total contributions would increase by
$2.7 billion (or 1 percent)—about 35 percent more than
the increase from extending the charitable deduction to
all taxpayers without a floor (Option 3). The tax subsidy
for charitable giving would rise by $7.1 billion (or 17 percent), of which only $0.8 billion would result from the
net change in donations. Most of the cost increase to the
government ($4.7 billion) would come from subsidizing
existing contributions by nonitemizers; another $2.5 billion would result from former itemizers who would
choose to take the standard deduction (see Table 4 on
page 14). Among taxpayers who continued to itemize
deductions, the increased tax subsidy for those with marginal tax rates below 25 percent would be slightly less
than the reduced subsidy for those with marginal rates
above 25 percent, resulting in a net decrease of $0.9 billion in the tax subsidy for that group.

Under the options that include a floor, the decrease in tax
subsidy rates would be concentrated among taxpayers
whose AGI was above $100,000. That decrease would
equal 0.16 percent of AGI under Option 7 and 0.35 percent of AGI under Option 8. For taxpayers with income
below $100,000, by contrast, the tax subsidy would
increase by approximately 0.1 percent of AGI under both
options.

If the credit applied only to contributions above the fixed
dollar floor in Option 7, total donations would increase
by $1.5 billion (or less than 1 percent), and the total tax
subsidy would decline by $2.4 billion (or 6 percent).
With the percentage-of-income floor in Option 8, total
contributions would decrease by $1.0 billion (or less than
1 percent), and the tax subsidy would drop by $11.9 billion (or 29 percent). Under both of those options,
increases in the tax subsidy from existing donations and
from the net change in giving would be outweighed by a
reduction in the subsidy from excluding tax benefits for
contributions below the floor.

 Option 10 would have the same fixed dollar floor as
Options 1, 4, and 7 ($500 for individuals and $1,000
for joint filers).

A nonrefundable tax credit for charitable giving available
to all filers would favor low- and middle-income taxpayers even more than a deduction for all filers would. The
reason is that the after-tax price of giving would be the
same for all taxpayers rather than being lower for people
with higher marginal income tax rates.
Option 6 would increase the tax subsidy for people with
income under $100,000 by approximately 0.3 percent
of AGI and for people with income between $100,000
and $200,000 by 0.02 percent of AGI (see Figure 5 on
page 16). Taxpayers with AGI above $200,000 are likely
to have marginal income tax rates greater than 25 percent. Consequently, their tax subsidy would fall under
Option 6—by 0.19 percent of AGI for taxpayers with
income between $200,000 and $500,000 and by
0.14 percent of AGI for those with income over
$500,000.

CBO

Options 9 to 11: Nonrefundable 15 Percent Credit
for All Taxpayers, With or Without a Floor
The last three options in CBO’s analysis are similar to
Options 6 to 8 but with a smaller credit. They would
replace the current deduction with a tax credit equal to
15 percent of a taxpayer’s donations, with the following
differences:
 Option 9 would have no floor.

 Option 11 would have the same percentage-of-income
floor as Options 2, 5, and 8 (2 percent of AGI).

The size of a tax credit for charitable giving affects not
just the magnitude but the direction of the effects. A
15 percent credit with no floor would decrease donations
relative to 2006 law (by $7.8 billion, or 4 percent),
whereas a similar 25 percent credit would increase donations relative to 2006 law (by $2.7 billion, or 1 percent).
Adding either type of floor to the 15 percent credit would
reduce donations by slightly larger amounts—and, again,
would result in fewer contributions than the comparable
options with a 25 percent credit. In all three cases, total
donations would be about 5 percent lower under the
options with a 15 percent credit than under the analogous options with a 25 percent credit because the smaller
credit would provide smaller tax incentives for charitable
giving.
The same pattern would occur for the total tax subsidy,
but the changes would be larger. With a 15 percent credit
and no floor (Option 9), the tax subsidy would fall by
$13.3 billion (or 33 percent) relative to 2006 law,
whereas with a 25 percent credit and no floor, the tax
subsidy would rise by $7.1 billion (or 17 percent). Adding the $500/$1,000 floor (Option 10) would reduce the
tax subsidy even more, by $19.0 billion (or 47 percent)
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relative to 2006 law, compared with a $2.4 billion reduction under the same fixed dollar floor and a 25 percent
credit. With a floor equal to 2 percent of AGI (Option
11), the 15 percent credit would reduce the tax subsidy
by $24.6 billion (or 60 percent), compared with an
$11.9 billion decrease under the comparable option with
a 25 percent credit. Virtually all of the reduction in the
subsidy would come from eliminating tax benefits for
charitable contributions below the floor.
Relative to 2006 law, taxpayers with AGI under $50,000
would see a small increase in their subsidy rate under all
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of the options with a 15 percent credit. That increase
would equal 0.12 percent of AGI with the credit alone
and 0.03 percent with the credit plus a floor. Taxpayers
whose AGI was between $50,000 and $100,000 would
see virtually no change in their subsidy rate with the
15 percent credit alone but a decrease equal to 0.11 percent of AGI with the fixed dollar floor or 0.15 percent of
AGI with the percentage-of-income floor. All three variants of the 15 percent credit would decrease subsidy rates
for income groups above $100,000, with the largest
reductions in this analysis coming from combining that
credit with a floor of 2 percent of AGI.

CBO

Appendix:
Sensitivity Analyses

T

he Congressional Budget Office (CBO) examined
how sensitive the total amount of charitable contributions and the level of the tax subsidy are to several different assumptions about the responsiveness of charitable
donations to the after-tax price of giving. The sensitivity
analyses involved assuming alternative elasticity values,
assuming different responses for small amounts of donations, and allowing for the possibility of changes in the
timing of donations.

Alternative Elasticity Values

In addition to the elasticity of -0.5 used in its base case,
CBO estimated the effects of the policy options under
two alternative assumptions—that charitable contributions do not change at all in response to changes in the
after-tax price of giving (an elasticity of 0) and that they
respond twice as strongly as assumed in the base case (an
elasticity of -1.0). Although different assumptions about
responsiveness result in different estimates of total giving
and costs to the government (see Table A-1), the results
are similar to those obtained with the base-case elasticity.
For example, under Option 3 (a deduction for all taxpayers), if the assumed elasticity was -1.0 instead of -0.5, the
tax subsidy would increase by $5.8 billion relative to current law rather than by $5.2 billion, and total charitable
giving would increase by $4.4 billion rather than by $2.0
billion. Alternatively, if taxpayers were assumed to have
no response to changes in the after-tax price of giving, the
tax subsidy would increase by $4.7 billion under Option
3 instead of by $5.2 billion, and there would be no
change in charitable giving. That pattern of results holds
for the other options as well.

Different Responses for Smaller
Donation Amounts

In its main analysis, CBO assumed that all charitable
contributions are sensitive to changes in the after-tax
price of giving. However, taxpayers’ regular donations to
churches and other religious organizations may be less
price-responsive than other contributions. CBO examined an alternative in which the first $275 in donations
by individuals and the first $550 by joint filers are
assumed not to be responsive to the price of giving.
(Those amounts are based on average contributions to
religious organizations by lower-income taxpayers,
according to CBO’s analysis of 2003 data from the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamics,
adjusted to 2006 levels.)
With that alternative assumption, the change in total
contributions by taxpayers under most options is slightly
smaller than in the base case because some portion of
giving is not responsive to a change in the after-tax price.
The net effect on giving under each option, however,
depends on whether a smaller increase in donations by
people whose after-tax price of giving falls exceeds a
smaller decrease in donations by people whose after-tax
price rises. The net change in contributions is small in
every option because, in the aggregate, the amounts of
giving assumed to be fixed represent less than one-quarter
of total contributions. The alternative assumption produces almost no difference in the change in the tax subsidy under any of the options relative to the base case (see
Table A-2 on page 24).
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Table A-1.

Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About the
Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving, 2006
Total
Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in Total
Contributions from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in
Tax Subsidy from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Current Law

Deduction for Itemizers with No Floor

203.0

n.a.

n.a.

40.9

n.a.

n.a.

Options to Change Current Law

Option 1—Deduction for
Itemizers with $500/$1,000 Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
202.5
202.1

0
-0.5
-0.9

0
-0.2
-0.4

35.3
35.4
35.4

-5.6
-5.5
-5.5

-13.6
-13.5
-13.5

Option 2—Deduction for
Itemizers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
200.0
197.4

0
-3.0
-5.6

0
-1.5
-2.7

25.1
25.2
25.2

-15.8
-15.7
-15.7

-38.7
-38.5
-38.3

Option 3—Deduction for
All Taxpayers with No Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
205.0
207.4

0
2.0
4.4

0
1.0
2.2

45.6
46.1
46.7

4.7
5.2
5.8

11.5
12.8
14.3

Option 4—Deduction for
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
203.8
204.9

0
0.8
1.9

0
0.4
0.9

38.2
38.4
38.7

-2.7
-2.5
-2.2

-6.7
-6.1
-5.4

Option 5—Deduction for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
201.1
199.9

0
-1.9
-3.1

0
-0.9
-1.5

27.5
27.8
28.0

-13.4
-13.1
-12.9

-32.8
-32.1
-31.5

Option 6—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with No Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
205.7
209.3

0
2.7
6.3

0
1.3
3.1

47.2
48.0
49.0

6.3
7.1
8.1

15.5
17.4
19.7

Option 7—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
204.5
206.7

0
1.5
3.7

0
0.7
1.8

38.0
38.5
39.3

-2.9
-2.4
-1.6

-7.1
-5.8
-4.0

Continued
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Table A-1.
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Continued

Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About the
Price Elasticity of Charitable Giving, 2006
Total
Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in Total
Contributions from
Current-Law Level
Billions
of Dollars
Percent

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in
Tax Subsidy from
Current-Law Level
Billions
of Dollars
Percent

Options to Change Current Law (Continued)

Option 8—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
202.0
202.0

0
-1.0
-1.0

0
-0.5
-0.5

28.4
29.0
29.7

-12.5
-11.9
-11.2

-30.6
-29.2
-27.4

Option 9—15 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with No Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
195.2
188.4

0
-7.8
-14.6

0
-3.9
-7.2

28.7
27.6
26.6

-12.2
-13.3
-14.3

-29.8
-32.6
-35.1

Option 10—15 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
194.4
186.9

0
-8.6
-16.1

0
-4.2
-7.9

23.1
21.9
20.8

-17.8
-19.0
-20.1

-43.5
-46.5
-49.1

Option 11—15 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
Elasticity of 0 (Not responsive)
Elasticity of -0.5
Elasticity of -1.0

203.0
193.0
184.4

0
-10.0
-18.6

0
-4.9
-9.1

17.3
16.3
15.4

-23.6
-24.6
-25.5

-57.6
-60.1
-62.3

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The analysis described in the main text of this report used an elasticity of -0.5 (meaning that a 1 percent increase in the price of giving
would reduce donations by 0.5 percent).
The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
n.a. = not applicable; $500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.

Possible Retiming of Giving

Policy options that allow tax benefits only for donations
in excess of a floor create an incentive for taxpayers to
retime their giving so it is bunched into fewer years. For
example, a family that typically donates $3,000 each year
and faces a floor of $1,000 could increase its tax subsidy
by instead donating $6,000 one year and nothing the
next year. With $3,000 in annual donations, the family
would have $2,000 above the floor in each year. But by
giving the same total amount in alternating years, the
family would have $5,000 above the floor in the year in

which it made the contributions, or $2,500 averaged over
the two years—making an additional $500 of its twoyear contributions eligible for a tax subsidy.
The estimates in CBO’s main analysis assumed no shift in
the timing of contributions between years. CBO recalculated the changes in total giving and in the tax subsidy,
averaged over two years, for selected options under the
assumption that each taxpayer gives the same average
annual amount but bunches his or her donations in alternate years. That assumption significantly reduces the tax
savings from the options involving a floor. For example,
CBO
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Table A-2.

Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About Whether a
Minimum Amount of Donations Is Unresponsive to Changes in the
After-Tax Price of Giving, 2006
Total
Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in Total
Contributions from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in
Tax Subsidy from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Percent
Dollars

Current Law

Deduction for Itemizers with No Floor

203.0

n.a.

n.a.

40.9

n.a.

n.a.

Options to Change Current Law

Option 1—Deduction for
Itemizers with $500/$1,000 Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

202.5
203.0

-0.5
*

-0.2
*

35.4
35.4

-5.5
-5.5

-13.5
-13.5

Option 2—Deduction for
Itemizers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

200.0
200.9

-3.0
-2.1

-1.5
-1.0

25.2
25.2

-15.7
-15.7

-38.5
-38.5

Option 3—Deduction for
All Taxpayers with No Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

205.0
204.2

2.0
1.2

1.0
0.6

46.1
45.9

5.2
5.0

12.8
12.3

Option 4—Deduction for
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

203.8
203.9

0.8
0.9

0.4
0.5

38.4
38.4

-2.5
-2.5

-6.1
-6.2

Option 5—Deduction for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

201.1
201.8

-1.9
-1.2

-0.9
-0.6

27.8
27.7

-13.1
-13.2

-32.1
-32.2

Option 6—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with No Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

205.7
204.2

2.7
1.2

1.3
0.6

48.0
47.6

7.1
6.7

17.4
16.4

Option 7—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

204.5
204.2

1.5
1.2

0.7
0.6

38.5
38.4

-2.4
-2.5

-5.8
-6.2

Option 8—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

202.0
202.2

-1.0
-0.8

-0.5
-0.4

29.0
28.8

-11.9
-12.1

-29.2
-29.6

Continued
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Effects of Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About Whether a
Minimum Amount of Donations Is Unresponsive to Changes in the
After-Tax Price of Giving, 2006
Total
Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in Total
Contributions from
Current-Law Level
Billions
of Dollars
Percent

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in
Tax Subsidy from
Current-Law Level
Billions
of Dollars
Percent

Options to Change Current Law (Continued)

Option 9—15 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with No Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

195.2
195.1

-7.8
-7.9

-3.9
-3.9

27.6
27.5

-13.3
-13.4

-32.6
-32.7

Option 10—15 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with $500/$1,000 Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

194.4
195.0

-8.6
-8.0

-4.2
-3.9

21.9
21.9

-19.0
-19.0

-46.5
-46.4

Option 11—15 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
No minimum
Minimum of $275/$550

193.0
194.0

-10.0
-9.0

-4.9
-4.5

16.3
16.3

-24.6
-24.6

-60.1
-60.1

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The analysis described in the main text of this report used the “no minimum” assumption (meaning that a taxpayer’s entire donations
would change in response to a change in the after-tax price of giving).
The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
n.a. = not applicable; $500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; $275/$550 = $275 for individual filers and
$550 for joint filers; * = between -0.05 and zero; AGI = adjusted gross income.

under Option 5 (a deduction for all taxpayers and a floor
equal to 2 percent of adjusted gross income), if taxpayers
bunched contributions in alternate years, the annual tax
savings would be $6.4 billion rather than $13.1 billion
(see Table A-3). At the same time, charitable giving
would increase by $0.3 billion rather than dropping by
$1.9 billion. Under Option 8 (a 25 percent tax credit
with the same percentage-of-income floor), annual tax
savings would be $4.9 billion rather than $11.9 billion,
and annual charitable contributions would increase by
$1.2 billion instead of declining by $1.0 billion. Even
with the assumption that taxpayers bunch contributions
in alternate years, the conclusion that a floor can noticeably reduce the total tax subsidy, with relatively modest
effects on giving, still holds.

The results of this sensitivity analysis are consistent with
the results that would occur with no bunching behavior
but with a floor half as big as the one examined (1 percent of adjusted gross income instead of 2 percent). In
other words, by giving every other year, taxpayers could
effectively cut the annual floor in half. Taxpayers could
further decrease the effectiveness of a floor by limiting
their contributions to fewer years—for example, by giving every third year instead of every other year, which
would effectively reduce the floor by two-thirds rather
than by half. Certain factors, however—such as annual
funding needs by organizations that receive donations—
might limit the extent to which taxpayers would want
to accelerate or defer contributions between years in
response to a floor on giving.

CBO
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Table A-3.

Effects of Selected Policy Options Under Alternative Assumptions About Whether
Taxpayers Retime Donations in Response to a Contribution Floor, 2006
Total
Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in Total
Contributions from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Change in
Tax Subsidy from
Current-Law Level
Billions of
Dollars
Percent

Current Law

Deduction for Itemizers with No Floor

203.0

n.a.

n.a.

40.9

n.a.

n.a.

Options to Change Current Law

Option 5—Deduction for All Taxpayers with
2 Percent of AGI Floor
No retiming of contributions
Contributions bunched in alternate years

201.1
203.3

-1.9
0.3

-0.9
0.1

27.8
34.5

-13.1
-6.4

-32.1
-15.7

Option 8—25 Percent Tax Credit for
All Taxpayers with 2 Percent of AGI Floor
No retiming of contributions
Contributions bunched in alternate years

202.0
204.2

-1.0
1.2

-0.5
0.6

29.0
36.0

-11.9
-4.9

-29.2
-12.0

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The analysis described in the main text of this report assumed no retiming of contributions between years. The alternative assumption
shown here, that taxpayers bunch contributions in alternate years, means that donors give two years’ worth of contributions every
other year to increase the amount that qualifies for a tax preference.
The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
n.a. = not applicable; AGI = adjusted gross income.
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U

nder current law, taxpayers who itemize deductions may deduct the amount they donate to charities
from their adjusted gross income (AGI) when determining how much they owe in federal income taxes. That
deduction gives people who itemize an incentive to contribute to charities. Like other forms of preferential tax
treatment, the deduction also costs the federal government revenues that it might otherwise collect. At current
levels of charitable giving, the cost of that deduction—
measured as the additional revenues that could be collected if the deduction was eliminated—will total about
$230 billion between 2010 and 2014, according to the
Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT).1
Numerous proposals have been made in recent years to
alter the income tax treatment of charitable giving by
individual donors. Some proposals aim to reduce the
cost to the government by imposing a floor (or minimum
level) that a person’s charitable giving would have to
exceed to qualify for preferential tax treatment. Other
proposals would extend the current charitable deduction
to taxpayers who do not itemize deductions or would
replace the current deduction with a nonrefundable tax
credit available to all taxpayers who make charitable
contributions.2

1. A deduction for charitable contributions also exists under the corporate income tax. JCT estimates a much smaller five-year cost for
that deduction: about $17 billion. See Joint Committee on Taxation, Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for Fiscal Years 2010–
2014, JCS-3-10 (December 15, 2010), www.jct.gov/publications
.html?func=startdown&id=3718.
2. Taxpayers can use tax credits to reduce their income tax liability
(the amount they owe). Nonrefundable credits can lower income
tax liability to zero, but excess credits cannot be used to increase
tax refunds. In contrast, refundable credits that exceed income tax
liability are paid to taxpayers as refunds.
MAY 2011

For this analysis, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
examined how much taxpayers in various income groups
donate to charities and what types of organizations
receive those donations. CBO also investigated how
changing the structure of tax incentives for giving would
affect the tax subsidy (the cost in forgone revenues to
the federal government), the overall level of charitable
giving, and the extent to which different income groups
benefit from the tax preference. Specifically, CBO looked
at 11 options for altering the current income tax treatment of charitable giving, which can be grouped into
4 categories:
 Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but
adding a floor.
 Allowing all taxpayers to claim the deduction, with or
without a floor.
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit
for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent of a taxpayer’s
charitable donations, with or without a floor.
 Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit
for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer’s
charitable donations, with or without a floor.

For each of the four categories, CBO analyzed two
potential floors: a fixed dollar amount ($500 for single
taxpayers and $1,000 for couples filing a joint return)
and a percentage of income (2 percent of AGI). Only
contributions in excess of the floor would be deductible
or eligible for a credit. The analysis uses data for 2006,
the most recent year for which the Internal Revenue Service’s public-use sample of individual income tax returns
is available. The tax treatment of charitable contributions
is generally the same today as it was in 2006; however,
CBO
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because of rising incomes and contribution amounts, the
options that include a fixed dollar floor would have a
somewhat different impact today than presented here.

Effects of Policy Options on Tax
Subsidies and Charitable Donations

According to CBO’s modeling, adding a contribution
floor to any of the approaches listed above would reduce
both the total federal tax subsidy and the total amount
donated to charity, relative to the same option without a
floor. In each case that CBO examined, the reduction in
the subsidy (and thus the increase in revenues) would
exceed the reduction in charitable contributions, whether
measured in dollars or as a percentage change. The reason
is that introducing a floor would continue to provide a
tax incentive for additional giving above the level of the
floor and at the same time reduce the tax subsidy for
donations that people might have made even without a
tax incentive.3
Allowing all taxpayers to claim a deduction for charitable
giving would have increased donations in 2006 by an
estimated $2.0 billion (or 1 percent) and increased the
total tax subsidy by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent) from the
2006 amounts. Combining a deduction for all taxpayers
with a floor, however, could both increase donations and
decrease the tax subsidy. For example, such a deduction
combined with a fixed dollar floor of $500/$1,000 would
have increased donations by $800 million in 2006 and
decreased the tax subsidy by $2.5 billion (see Summary
Table 1).
Replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent tax
credit would increase donations and also increase the government’s forgone revenues. Combining such a credit
with certain contribution floors, however, could boost
donations while reducing the tax subsidy or could
decrease donations by a small percentage while reducing
the tax subsidy by a large percentage. Setting the credit at
15 percent would reduce donations but would reduce the
tax subsidy by a larger amount (both in dollars and as a
percentage change).

CBO

3. The fact that some nonitemizers contribute to charities despite
receiving no tax benefits for doing so suggests that a substantial
amount of charitable giving would still occur in the absence of a
tax incentive.

Effects of Policy Options on
Various Income Groups

Changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions
would have differing effects on taxpayers at different
points on the income scale. Adding a contribution floor
to the current deduction for itemizers would reduce tax
subsidies for all income groups, but for high-income
taxpayers, the size of the reduction would vary significantly depending on the type of floor used. For instance,
augmenting the deduction with a fixed dollar floor of
$500/$1,000 in 2006 would have lowered the tax subsidy
for people with AGI over $100,000 by 0.08 percent of
their AGI, whereas adding a floor equal to 2 percent of
AGI would have lowered the tax subsidy for that income
group by 0.30 percent of their AGI.
Making the deduction for charitable contributions available to nonitemizers would benefit lower- and middleincome taxpayers, who tend not to itemize deductions
because their deductible expenses (such as mortgage
interest and state and local taxes, as well as charitable
donations) are not large enough to exceed the standard
deduction. Those groups would benefit even more if the
current deduction—which tends to help higher-income
taxpayers more because they face higher tax rates—was
replaced with a nonrefundable credit that gave all income
groups the same tax incentives for giving. For example,
replacing the deduction with a 25 percent credit in 2006
would have increased the tax subsidy for taxpayers with
AGI below $100,000 by 0.27 percent of their AGI, but it
would have decreased the tax subsidy for people above
that income level by 0.09 percent of AGI. Tax subsidies
would be lower for all income groups with a 15 percent
credit than with a 25 percent credit.

Caveats About This Analysis

The results of CBO’s policy simulations are meant to
highlight the general effects of the various approaches.
The exact size of those effects, however, would depend on
the specific parameters of a policy—such as the level of
the floor or the amount of the credit—as well as on the
extent to which taxpayers would change the amount of
their charitable giving in response to a change in the tax
subsidy. In addition, this analysis does not reflect many of
the other ways in which taxpayers might respond to a
change in their tax subsidy, such as shifting donations
between years. (In the appendix, CBO examines how
sensitive the results of this study are to several different
assumptions, including variations in taxpayers’ responsiveness to changes in their tax subsidy and the possibility
of shifts in the timing of donations.)

SUMMARY
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Summary Table 1.

Summary of Total Donations and Tax Subsidies Under Current Law and
Eleven Policy Options, 2006
Total Contributions
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Floor for
Eligible Donations

Tax Subsidy
(Billions of
2006 dollars)

Current Law

Deduction Available Only to Itemizers

203.0

No floor

40.9

Change from Current Law

Keep Deduction Available Only to Itemizers but
Add Floor
Option 1
Option 2

$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

-0.5
-3.0

-5.5
-15.7

Extend Deduction to All Filers
Option 3
Option 4
Option 5

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

2.0
0.8
-1.9

5.2
-2.5
-13.1

Convert Deduction to 25 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Option 6
Option 7
Option 8

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

2.7
1.5
-1.0

7.1
-2.4
-11.9

Convert Deduction to 15 Percent Nonrefundable
Credit for All Filers
Option 9
Option 10
Option 11

No floor
$500/$1,000
2 percent of AGI

-7.8
-8.6
-10.0

-13.3
-19.0
-24.6

Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes: The simulation results are for tax year 2006, and all figures are at 2006 levels.
$500/$1,000 = $500 for individual filers and $1,000 for joint filers; AGI = adjusted gross income.
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Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of
Charitable Giving
The deductibility of charitable donations has been a feature of the U.S. individual income tax
almost as long as the modern income tax has been in existence. Although the deduction
encourages charitable giving, like other forms of preferential tax treatment, it results in loss
revenue to the federal government. At current levels of charitable giving, the cost of that
deduction—measured as the additional revenues that could be collected if the deduction was
eliminated—will total about $230 billion between 2010 and 2014, according to the Joint
Committee on Taxation.
At the request of the House Budget Committee, CBO released a study today entitled Options for
Changing the Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving. The study examines patterns of individual
charitable giving and analyzes how options for changing the tax treatment of such giving might
affect the overall amount of donations, the costs to the federal government, and the distribution
of tax benefits among different income groups.
CBO’s Analysis
Under current law, taxpayers who itemize deductions may deduct the amount they donate to
charities from their adjusted gross income (AGI) when determining how much they owe in
federal income taxes. CBO looked at 11 options for altering that approach to the treatment of
charitable giving, which can be grouped into four categories:


Retaining the current deduction for itemizers but adding a floor—a minimum amount that
a person’s charitable giving would have to exceed to qualify for preferential tax
treatment.





Allowing all taxpayers, not just those who itemize, to claim the deduction, with or
without a floor.
Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit for all taxpayers, equal to 25 percent
of a taxpayer’s charitable donations, with or without a floor.
Replacing the deduction with a nonrefundable credit for all taxpayers, equal to 15 percent
of a taxpayer’s charitable donations, with or without a floor.

For each of the four categories, CBO analyzed two potential floors: a fixed dollar amount ($500
for single taxpayers and $1,000 for couples filing a joint return) and a percentage of income (2
percent of AGI). Only contributions in excess of the floor would be deductible or eligible for a
credit.
General Effects of Options for Changing the Charitable Deduction
CBO estimated what the budgetary impact of the policy options would have been in 2006, the
most recent year for which the Internal Revenue Service’s public-use sample of individual
income tax returns is available. In that year, contributions totaled $203 billion and the tax
subsidy—the cost in forgone revenues to the federal government—was $40.9 billion. As
summarized in the following table CBO estimates that:








Adding a contribution floor to any of the approaches listed above would reduce both the
tax subsidy and the total amount donated to charity, relative to the same option without a
floor. In each case that CBO examined, the reduction in the subsidy—and thus the
increase in revenues—would exceed the reduction in charitable contributions, whether
measured in dollars or as a percentage change. The reason is that introducing a floor
would continue to provide a tax incentive for additional giving above the floor while
reducing the tax subsidy for donations that people might have made even without a tax
incentive.
Allowing all taxpayers to claim a deduction for charitable giving would have increased
donations in 2006 by an estimated $2.0 billion (or 1 percent) and increased the total tax
subsidy in that year by $5.2 billion (or 13 percent).
Combining a deduction for all taxpayers with a floor, however, could both increase
donations and decrease the tax subsidy. For example, such a deduction combined with a
fixed dollar floor of $500/$1,000 would have increased donations by $800 million in
2006 and decreased the tax subsidy by $2.5 billion.
Replacing the current deduction with a 25 percent tax credit would increase donations
and also increase the tax subsidy.

This analysis estimates the cost of the tax preference for charitable donations by focusing on the
change in revenues directly attributable to the amount of charitable giving. That approach differs
from the type of revenue estimates that are the responsibility of the staff of the Joint Committee
on Taxation (JCT). JCT’s estimates would reflect many of the ways in which taxpayers might
alter their behavior in response to the existence of the tax preference, such as changing the
timing of donations between years and changing their tax compliance. The measure that CBO
used does not reflect all of the behavioral assumptions that would be included in a revenue
estimate; it accounts only for changes in the amount of charitable giving and any changes in the

extent to which taxpayers itemize their deductions that would occur if the standard deduction
was larger than a taxpayer’s noncharitable itemized deductions.
The results of CBO’s policy simulations are meant to highlight the general effects of the various
approaches. The exact size of those effects, however, would depend on the specific parameters of
a policy—such as the level of the floor or the amount of the credit—as well as on the extent to
which taxpayers would change the amount of their charitable giving in response to a change in
the tax subsidy.
Effects on Various Income Groups
Changing the tax treatment of charitable contributions would have differing effects on taxpayers
at different points on the income scale. Adding a contribution floor to the current deduction for
itemizers would reduce tax subsidies for all income groups, but for high-income taxpayers, the
size of the reduction would vary significantly depending on the type of floor used. For example,
a floor equal to 2 percent of AGI would reduce subsidies by a greater amount than a fixed-dollar
floor of $500/$1,000 in 2006.
Making the deduction for charitable contributions available to non-itemizers would benefit
lower- and middle-income taxpayers, who tend not to itemize deductions because their
deductible expenses (such as mortgage interest and state and local taxes, as well as charitable
donations) are not large enough to exceed the standard deduction. Those groups would benefit
even more if the current deduction—which tends to help higher-income taxpayers more because
they face higher tax rates—was replaced with a nonrefundable credit that gave all income groups
the same tax incentives for giving.
This study was prepared by Athiphat Muthitacharoen of CBO’s Tax Analysis Division, and Seth
Giertz, formerly of CBO.

